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HARMELIN’S FAULTY ORIGINALISM
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer*
Justice Thomas wrote in 2010: “It is by now well established that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was originally understood as prohibit-
ing [only] torturous ‘methods of punishment.’ ”1 In the world of advertising,
this might be called “puffery.”2 In the academic world, there are stronger words
for such a demonstrably untrue claim. It has been twenty-three years since Jus-
tice Scalia penned his plurality opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan,3 on which
Justice Thomas’ claim is based, asserting that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause was not understood in 1791 as encompassing a requirement of
proportionality. Yet, since that time, no more than three of the sixteen Justices
who have sat on the Court have adhered to this view.4 At the same time, how-
ever, the originalist arguments in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Harmelin
have gone virtually unchallenged by other Members of the Court.
Moreover, while Justice Scalia’s position has attracted only a smattering
of support from the academic world,5 the issue was generally ignored by aca-
demics until recently. Commentators had all but ceded the originalism argu-
ment and had looked elsewhere for support for an Eighth Amendment
proportionality principle. Since 2004, however, a handful of scholars have
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1 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 99 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 (1991) (plurality opinion)). I have added the word “only” to
make explicit what Justice Thomas makes clear just four sentences later: his belief that
“there is virtually no indication that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause originally
was understood to require proportionality in sentencing.” Id.
2 See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1400
(2006).
3 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 961 (plurality opinion).
4 Only Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the relevant part of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Harme-
lin. Id. But see infra note 11 (observing that Chief Justice Rehnquist later joined the plurality
opinion in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003), which recognized a narrow propor-
tionality principle). Only Justice Scalia joined the relevant part of Justice Thomas’s opinion
in Graham, 560 U.S. at 97. Thirteen other Members of the Court have either declined to
express the opinion that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause contains no proportion-
ality principle or have expressly disagreed with that view. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2460 (2012) (Kagan, J., joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.); id.
at 2487 (Alito, J., dissenting); Graham, 560 U.S. at 86 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the
judgment); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 35 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., joined by O’Connor & Souter, JJ.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1009 (White, J., joined by Black-
mun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also infra note 20.
5 See, e.g., Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 43–49 (2000).
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focused on constructing an originalist account of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause that encompasses a proportionality component.6
This Article constitutes a point-by-point refutation of Justice Scalia’s
arguments in Harmelin. Part I briefly discusses Harmelin and its continuing
influence, in order to demonstrate the danger of letting its faux originalism go
unchallenged. Part II then outlines and explodes the four major arguments Jus-
tice Scalia set forth in his plurality opinion in Harmelin. With regard to some
of these arguments, this Article demonstrates that the evidence is not entirely
clear either way as to whether the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was
understood in 1791 as covering disproportionality of punishments. One could
stop there and be satisfied that it is by no means “well established that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause was originally understood as prohibiting
[only] torturous methods of punishment.”7 But other evidence that Justice
Scalia chose to ignore flatly refutes the notion that the Clause was understood
as covering only methods of punishment. Finally, Part III discusses state legis-
lation during the brief period of the Articles of Confederation that uses the term
“cruel or unusual” to constrain Congress’ punishment power vis-à-vis violators
of confederal customs legislation. It is reasonably clear that the term “cruel or
unusual” in that context referred to punishment that was disproportionate in
some way, not to punishment that was altogether forbidden under any circum-
stance. The use of that term in the brief period after similar language appeared
in state bills of rights and before the Eighth Amendment was drafted strongly
suggests that the latter was also understood as containing a proportionality
component.
6 See generally Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 119 (2004) [hereinafter Claus, Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment]; Lau-
rence Claus, Methodology, Proportionality, Equality: Which Moral Question Does the
Eighth Amendment Pose?, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35 (2008) [hereinafter Claus, Meth-
odology]; Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98
IOWA L. REV. 69 (2012) [hereinafter Mannheimer, Federal Punishments]; John F. Stin-
neford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008) [hereinafter Stinneford, Original Meaning];
John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011) [hereinafter Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality]. A
generation earlier, Anthony Granucci set forth perhaps the first originalist approach to the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See generally Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
Claus appears to disclaim the “proportionality” tag. See Claus, Methodology, supra, at
38 (setting forth disproportionality and “invidious discrimination” as “distinct moral”
issues). However, his ultimate conclusion—that “the Eighth Amendment condemns punish-
ing a person or class of persons more harshly than others for morally insufficient reason[s],”
Claus, Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, supra, at 149—sets forth, as I read it, a type
of proportionality requirement.
Stinneford’s work has been particularly thorough, persuasive, and powerful in
debunking the Harmelin myth. See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, On Proportionality and
Federalism: A Response to Professor Stinneford, 97 VA. L. REV. (IN BRIEF) 51, 52 (2011)
[hereinafter Mannheimer, Response] (praising Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality,
supra). Nevertheless, there are some flaws in Justice Scalia’s claims and methodology that
Stinneford does not address, and I disagree with a number of Stinneford’s assertions and
conclusions.
7 Graham, 560 U.S. at 99 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
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I. THE ENDURING SIGNIFICANCE OF HARMELIN
In Harmelin v. Michigan, the petitioner claimed that his sentence of life
imprisonment without parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine
violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment,
as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was disproportionate
to the crime.8 The Court rejected that argument 5 to 4. However, no opinion
commanded a majority of the Justices. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
O’Connor and Souter, in a concurring opinion that later assumed the status of
law,9 wrote that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause encompassed a bar
on carceral punishments that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime of con-
viction, but that the punishment meted out to Harmelin did not violate that
principle.10 In an opinion joined only by himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist,11
Justice Scalia laid out the case for the position that the Clause does not encom-
pass a proportionality requirement at all.12 Rather, the argument goes, the
Clause forbids only certain methods of punishment, which cannot be inflicted
for any type of offense.13 The foundation of this argument is the claim that the
Clause was not understood in 1791 as encompassing a principle of
proportionality.
Justice Scalia’s suggestion that the Eighth Amendment contains no pro-
portionality requirement was a break with the past. Eleven years earlier, in
Rummel v. Estelle, the Court rejected a claim that a prison sentence was uncon-
stitutionally disproportionate but stopped short of concluding that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause contains no proportionality principle whatso-
ever.14 Just three years after that, in Solem v. Helm, the Court found that the
Clause did indeed contain such a precept when it held that a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole was disproportionate to the crime of “uttering a
‘no account’ check for $100” as a seventh felony.15 The Court has held on five
8 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961 (plurality opinion). Harmelin also claimed that the sentence
violated the Eighth Amendment, as incorporated, because it was mandatory. See id. at
961–62. The Court rejected that claim. See id. at 994–96.
9 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59 (describing Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion in Harmelin
as “[t]he controlling opinion”); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23–24 (plurality opinion) (utilizing Jus-
tice Kennedy’s test in Harmelin); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive
Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 693 (2005) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s separate opinion
in Harmelin “eventually came to assume the status of law”).
10 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
11 By later joining the plurality opinion in Ewing, 538 U.S at 14, which recognized a narrow
proportionality principle, id. at 21, Chief Justice Rehnquist distanced himself from the posi-
tion expressed by Justice Scalia in Harmelin.
12 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 993 (plurality opinion).
13 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Eighth
Amendment is addressed to always-and-everywhere ‘cruel’ punishments, such as the rack
and the thumbscrew.”).
14 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (“[O]ne could argue without fear of contra-
diction by any decision of th[e] Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable
as felonies . . . the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
prerogative.”).
15 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279–82, 303 (1983). The Court had recognized a propor-
tionality principle in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as long ago as 1910. See
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occasions, before and since Harmelin, that a death sentence was a dispropor-
tionate punishment, given the nature of the offense or the characteristics of the
offender, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.16 More
recently, the Court held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause renders
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole disproportionate to non-homi-
cide crimes when committed by juvenile offenders,17 and that laws imposing a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole on juvenile offenders
violate the Constitution.18
Following Harmelin, Justice Thomas, who joined the Court subsequent to
that case, has indicated his agreement with Justice Scalia’s opinion in Harme-
lin.19 The opinion has been cited a number of times by Justices Scalia and
Thomas—as recently as June 25, 2012—for the proposition that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, as originally understood, did not contain a pro-
portionality requirement.20 In short, Harmelin is not going away. It is therefore
important that its faulty originalism be exposed.
II. DECONSTRUCTING HARMELIN
Justice Scalia’s originalist arguments in Harmelin fall into four general
categories. First, he looked at the origin and surrounding circumstances of the
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). However, it is unclear whether Weems rested
entirely on that ground, and Weems is problematic as precedent, having arisen from the US
Territory of the Philippines. See Mannheimer, Federal Punishments, supra note 6, at 81. For
the definitive treatment of Weems, see Margaret Raymond, “No Fellow in American Legis-
lation”: Weems v. United States and the Doctrine of Proportionality, 30 VT. L. REV. 251,
267–301 (2006).
16 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008) (forbidding capital punishment for
the rape of a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (holding capital punish-
ment unconstitutional for capital offenses committed by those under age eighteen); Atkins,
536 U.S. at 321 (holding capital punishment unconstitutional for intellectually disabled capi-
tal offenders); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (forbidding capital punishment
for felony murderers whose participation in felony and culpability for killing fell below
certain threshold levels); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595–96 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(forbidding capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman). In Harmelin, Justice Scalia
indicated that he would grudgingly accept this line of case law but would limit it to the
capital context. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (plurality opinion) (“Proportionality review is
one of several respects in which we have held that ‘death is different,’ and have imposed
protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides.”).
17 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
18 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
19 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 97 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,
32 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
20 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting); Graham, 560
U.S. at 97 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., &
Thomas, J., dissenting). Neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito has expressed a
definitive opinion on this issue. In Graham, 560 U.S. at 86 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the
judgment), Chief Justice Roberts wrote that because “[n]either party here asks us to reexam-
ine our precedents requiring . . . proportionality [pursuant to the Eighth Amendment,] . . .  I
approach this case by trying to apply our past decisions to the facts at hand.” Justice Alito
joined Parts I and III of Justice Thomas’ dissent in that case, id. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting),
pointedly declining to join Part II, which disputed that the Eighth Amendment contains a
proportionality principle, id. at 98.
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English Bill of Rights of 1689, the progenitor of our own Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.21 Second, he discussed ratification era statements regard-
ing cruel and unusual punishments.22 Third, he performed a textual analysis of
the Clause, and a textual comparison between it and the analogous state consti-
tutional provisions that were contemporaneous with the Clause.23 Finally, he
looked at nineteenth-century academic and state court interpretations of federal
and state constitutional provisions forbidding cruel and unusual punishment.24
While some of these arguments are better than others, Justice Scalia ultimately
failed to carry the burden of showing that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause was originally understood to address only methods of punishment.
A. Origins of the 1689 English Bill of Rights
In Harmelin, Justice Scalia recognized that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause was taken from language in the Virginia Declaration of Rights,
which in turn was taken verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.25
Thus, the starting point for determining the meaning of our own Clause is the
analogous Clause in the 1689 Bill and the circumstances surrounding its
enactment.26
It is well settled among courts and commentators that the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishments Clause of the 1689 Bill was a reaction to some of the
excesses of Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys of King’s Bench, and, in particular, the
Titus Oates affair.27 In 1679, Oates, a Protestant cleric, committed perjury in
the treason trial of a number of Catholics who had supposedly plotted to assas-
sinate King Charles II.28 As a result of Oates’ perjured testimony, more than a
dozen innocent men were executed.29 Six years later, Oates was convicted of
perjury before Jeffreys.30 Jeffreys sentenced Oates to defrocking and a fine of
two thousand marks. In addition, he ordered that Oates be “whipped from
21 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966–74.
22 See id. at 979–80.
23 See id. at 975–78.
24 See id. at 981–85.
25 See id. at 966.
26 See id. at 967.
27 See id. at 969–74; Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, When the Federal Death Penalty Is
“Cruel and Unusual,” 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 833–34 (2006).
28 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969; Claus, Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, supra note
6, at 136; Mannheimer, supra note 27, at 833; William Hughes Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual
Punishments: The Proportionality Rule, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 640–41 (1979); Charles
Walter Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of
William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 379 (1980); Chris Baniszewski, Com-
ment, Supreme Court Review of Excessive Prison Sentences: The Eighth Amendment’s Pro-
portionality Requirement, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 929, 932 (1993).
29 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969; Baniszewski, supra note 28, at 932; Claus, Antidis-
crimination Eighth Amendment, supra note 6, at 136; Granucci, supra note 6, at 857; Mann-
heimer, supra note 27, at 833; Mulligan, supra note 28, at 641; Schwartz, supra note 28, at
379.
30 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969; Baniszewski, supra note 28, at 932; Granucci, supra note
6, at 857; Mannheimer, supra note 27, at 833; Mulligan, supra note 28, at 641.
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Aldgate to Newgate”31 the following Wednesday and “from Newgate to
Tyburn”32 the following Friday, that he be pilloried four times a year, and that
he be imprisoned for life.33
After the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the English Bill was
adopted in 1689, Oates asked Parliament to relieve him from his sentence.34
The House of Commons voted to grant him relief and issued a report explain-
ing their conclusion that the sentence violated the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause.35 The House of Lords, however, disagreed and Oates was denied
relief.36 But the dissenters in the House of Lords also issued an opinion provid-
ing a number of reasons why the sentence violated the Clause.37
According to Justice Scalia, these two documents demonstrate that a pun-
ishment was not considered to violate the 1689 Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause based on its disproportionality. Rather, the argument goes, that Clause
would forbid a punishment only “because it [wa]s ‘out of [the Judges’] Power,’
‘contrary to Law and ancient practice,’ without ‘Precedents’ or ‘express Law to
warrant,’ ‘unusual,’ ‘illegal,’ or imposed by ‘Pretence to a discretionary
Power.’ ”38 Thus, according to Justice Scalia, the Clause “was primarily a
requirement that judges pronouncing sentence remain within the bounds of
common-law tradition,” unless a deviation from the common law was author-
ized by Parliament.39 He considered it “most unlikely” that the Clause forbade
disproportionate punishments.40
But a constraint that judges sentence only as authorized by common law or
statute and a constraint that they impose punishments that are not dispropor-
tionate are not mutually exclusive. To be sure, a punishment might be outside
of the power of the judge to inflict because it is of a particular type. For exam-
ple, the defrocking of Oates violated this precept. Thus, the dissenting Lords
objected
that the king’s bench, being a temporal court, made it part of the judgment, that Titus
Oates, being a clerk, should for his said perjuries, be divested of his canonical and
priestly habit, and to continue divested all his life; which is a matter wholly out of
their power, belonging to the ecclesiastical courts only.41
31 This was a distance of about one-and-a-half miles. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 236–37 (1999).
32 This was a distance of about two miles. See id.
33 The Second Trial of Titus Oates (1685), reprinted in 10 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF
STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEAN-
ORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 1227, 1316–17 (T.B. Howell ed.,
1816) [hereinafter Second Trial of Titus Oates].
34 See id. at1317; see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 970; Baniszewski, supra note 28, at 933;
Claus, Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, supra note 6, at 139; Mannheimer, supra note
27, at 834; Schwartz, supra note 28, at 379.
35 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 971; Claus, Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, supra note
6, at 139; Mannheimer, supra note 27, at 834; Schwartz, supra note 28, at 379.
36 See Baniszewski, supra note 28, at 933; Claus, Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment,
supra note 6, at 140; Mannheimer, supra note 27, at 834.
37 See Second Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 33, at 1325.
38 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 973 (first alteration added).
39 Id. at 974.
40 Id.
41 See Second Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 33, at 1325.
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The House of Commons likewise wrote in its report that “it was surely of
ill Example for a Temporal Court to give Judgment, That a Clerk be divested of
his Canonical Habits; and continue so divested during his Life.”42
But a punishment might also be outside the statutory or common-law
authority of a judge to impose because it is excessive. Many of the statements
made in the two reports seem to point to this meaning. For example, the punish-
ment was described as “extravagant” and “exorbitant” in the Commons
report,43 which indicates the view of the Commons that at least some aspects of
the punishment violated the Clause because the punishment was excessive.44
Moreover, the Commons report also complained that “[i]t was of ill Example,
and unusual, [t]hat an Englishman should be exposed upon a Pillory, so many
times a Year, during his Life.”45 And Sir William Williams commented in the
House of Commons that what was objectionable about Oates’ punishment was
the accumulation of so many different aspects of punishment to be inflicted on
one person.46 Indeed, because fine, imprisonment, pillorying, and whipping
were all commonly used punishments at the time,47 the better view is that it
was the amount of punishment and the combination of punishments that was
thought contrary to the Clause. Accordingly, “Justice Scalia’s attempt to sepa-
rate the unprecedented nature of Oates’s punishments from their excessiveness
was mistaken.”48 The punishments were beyond the judge’s power to impose
because they were excessive.
In order to come to a contrary conclusion, Justice Scalia simply ignored
five words from the statement of the dissenting Lords that show beyond perad-
venture that the Lords were objecting to the excessiveness of the punishment
for the crime committed. The dissenting Lords wrote that “there is no prece-
dents [sic] to warrant the punishments of whipping and committing to prison
for life, for the crime of perjury.”49 Thus, their complaint was not that whip-
ping and life imprisonment were unauthorized modes of punishment, but only
that the punishments were unauthorized—that is, excessive—for the crime of
conviction.50 Justice Scalia’s opinion in Harmelin simply ignored this.51
42 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 972 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 British History, 10 H.C. JOUR. 249 (Aug. 2, 1689), available at http://www.british-histo
ry.ac.uk/source.aspx?pubid=115.
44 Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 6, at 934.
45 British History, supra note 43, at 247 (emphasis added).
46 See Claus, Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, supra note 6, at 140 (“ ‘There may be
a Precedent for whipping, but for all these parts in one Judgment, let any man give us a
Precedent to square with that Judgment.’ ”) (quoting 9 DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
291 (Anchitell Grey ed., 1763)).
47 See id. at 143 (“The methods mandated by the Oates . . . judgments were wholly
unremarkable.”); Granucci, supra note 6, at 859 (observing that life imprisonment, whip-
ping, and fines were commonly imposed in 1689); Stinneford, Original Meaning, supra note
6, at 1820 (“The punishments inflicted on Oates—floggings, pillorying, imprisonment, and
fines—were all methods of punishment that fell well within the common law tradition.”).
48 Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 6, at 934.
49 Second Trial of Titus Oates, supra note 33, at 1325 (emphasis added).
50 See Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
475, 510–11 (2005).
51 Similarly, Parr, supra note 5, at 44, entirely ignores five of the six paragraphs of the
dissenting Lords’ statement.
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Justice Scalia did make two trenchant points that tend to show that the
1689 Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause did not forbid sentences that were
disproportionately harsh in relation to the crimes committed. First, he suggested
that, given that Oates’ perjuries led to the deaths of at least fifteen innocent
men, Oates’ sentence, harsh as it was, was not disproportionate to the crime.52
Second, he observed that, for well over a century after 1689, England continued
to punish over 200 crimes with death.53 Justice Scalia was correct to suggest
that these examples indicate that the 1689 Clause did not forbid punishment
that was disproportionate to crime severity. Similarly, Justice Scalia keenly
observed that the First Congress, after proposing the Eighth Amendment to the
States, prescribed death as the penalty for such disparate crimes as forgery of
United States securities and murder.54 This, too, militates toward a conclusion
that our Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was not understood as requir-
ing proportionality between punishment severity and crime gravity. It does not
rule out, however, a different type of proportionality principle, that a punish-
ment must not be excessive compared to some benchmark other than the grav-
ity of the crime.
For example, these observations are entirely consistent with Laurence
Claus’ thesis that the Clause “condemns punishing a person or class of persons
more harshly than others for morally insufficient reason[s].”55 That is to say,
Claus’ position is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause requires pro-
portionality in sentencing among similarly situated offenders. Likewise, Justice
Scalia’s assertions are consistent with my own argument that the Clause is best
understood as requiring proportionality between federal and state sentencing
practices.56 Thus, history does not support Justice Scalia’s conclusion that
“[t]he Eighth Amendment is addressed [only] to always-and-everywhere ‘cruel’
punishments, such as the rack and the thumbscrew.”57
B. Statements Made During the Ratification Process
Justice Scalia was on a somewhat surer footing when he asserted that
statements made during the ratification process demonstrate that the framers
and ratifiers of the Eighth Amendment understood the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause to forbid only certain methods of punishment. Yet, again, the
few relevant statements made during the ratification period are not inconsistent
with the Clause’s encompassing some type of proportionality requirement.
Justice Scalia quoted Abraham Holmes’ and Patrick Henry’s comments
opposing ratification of the Constitution in the Massachusetts and Virginia rati-
fying conventions, respectively. Holmes complained that
Congress [would be] possessed of powers enabling them to institute judicatories little
less inauspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain, which has long been the disgrace of
Christendom: I mean that diabolical institution, the Inquisition.
52 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 973 n.4 (1991) (plurality opinion).
53 See id. at 975.
54 See id. at 980–81.
55 Claus, Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, supra note 6, at 149.
56 Mannheimer, Federal Punishments, supra note 6, at 72.
57 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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What gives an additional glare of horror to these gloomy circumstances is . . . that
Congress . . . [is] nowhere restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of
punishments, and annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on
them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their
discipline.58
Similarly, Henry, after reminding his fellow delegates of Virginia’s own
provision against cruel and unusual punishments, lamented the absence of a
similar provision in the proposed national Constitution: “In this business of
legislation, your Members of Congress will lose the restriction of not . . .
inflicting cruel and unusual punishments.—These are prohibited by your Dec-
laration of Rights. What has distinguished our ancestors?—That they would not
admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishments.”59
Yet neither of these statements can be read to exclude a proportionality
principle. These statements suggest that forbidding certain methods of punish-
ment was foremost in the minds of at least two members of the generation that
framed and ratified the Eighth Amendment. But the statements do not exclude
the possibility that the framers and ratifiers also were concerned with punish-
ments that were excessive. Indeed, the statements fit comfortably with the idea
that those who proposed and ratified the Eighth Amendment were mainly con-
cerned with a type of proportionality principle: that federal punishments not be
more severe than those meted out by the States, whether in the method of pun-
ishment or otherwise.60 For example, by referring to “your Declaration of
Rights,” Henry was reminding his fellow Virginia delegates that the bar on
cruel and unusual punishments applicable to them was specific to Virginia and
was bemoaning the fact that the same constraint did not apply to the federal
government.
Moreover, the suggestion that the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause is limited by the few statements made on the subject during
the ratification period proves too much, given Henry’s remarks immediately
following those quoted by Justice Scalia in his Harmelin plurality opinion:
But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the
common law.—They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany—Of
torturing to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well
draw examples from those countries as from Great-Britain; and they will tell you,
that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of Government that they must
have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still
more relentless severity.61
Henry thus equated “punishment” with the practice of torturing to extract a
confession of a crime.62 Yet the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the
58 Abraham Holmes, Address to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Jan. 9, 1788), in 2
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 109, 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (emphasis omitted).
59 Patrick Henry, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 1788), in 5 THE COM-
PLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 207, 249 (Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry, eds., 1981).
60 See Mannheimer, Federal Punishments, supra note 6, at 72.
61 Patrick Henry, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 1788), supra note 59
(emphasis added).
62 See Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the
Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661, 681 (2004).
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notion that “punishment” within the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause can occur before a criminal conviction is obtained.63 Thus, if we
limit our understanding of cruel and unusual punishments based on Henry’s
remarks, we would be left with the paradox that the framers and ratifiers of the
Clause meant it to apply primarily, or even exclusively, in a context in which
the Supreme Court has firmly denied that the Clause has any application
whatsoever.
C. Textual Points
Justice Scalia also relied on a number of textual points to show that the
phrase “cruel and unusual” could not have encompassed a proportionality
requirement. While these arguments appear at first blush to be persuasive, they
crumble upon closer examination.
First, Justice Scalia observed that the constitutions of New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina each contained a provision requiring that
punishments be made “ ‘in general more proportionate to the crimes’ ”64 or
“ ‘proportioned to the nature of the offence.’ ”65 In addition, the New Hamp-
shire Constitution, like the Ohio Constitution adopted only twelve years after
the Eighth Amendment was ratified, contained both a proportionality provision
and a ban on “cruel and unusual” (or “cruel or unusual”) punishments.66 Had a
ban on cruel and unusual punishments been thought to have encompassed a
proportionality requirement, the argument goes, a separate such requirement
would have been superfluous.
The fatal flaw of this argument is that it conceives of only one kind of
excessiveness: excessiveness of the punishment when compared to the crime.
But the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause might encompass a principle of
proportionality that uses as its benchmark of excessiveness something other
than the gravity of the offense. Again, for example, the Clause might demand
proportionality among similarly situated offenders.67 If so, then it would not be
odd at all to include two separate provisions in a state constitution: one forbid-
ding punishments disproportionate to the gravity of the offense and one forbid-
ding punishments disproportionate in some other way.68
Justice Scalia also pointed to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment to show that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was not
intended to address excessiveness of sentences. Because fines are a type of
punishment, the arguments goes, it would be superfluous to prohibit excessive
63 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72 n.40 (1977) (“[T]he State does not acquire the
power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a
formal adjudication of guilt . . . .”).
64 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 977 (1991) (plurality opinion) (quoting PA. CONST.
of 1776, § 38; S.C. CONST. OF 1778, art. XL).
65 Id. (quoting N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1784, art. XVIII).
66 Id. at 977–78 (citing N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1784, arts. XVIII, XXXIII; OHIO CONST. of
1802, art. VIII, §§ 13, 14).
67 See Claus, Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, supra note 6, at 121.
68 Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 6, at 955–58, provides an additional
explanation for the two types of provisions: the “cruel and unusual punishments” provisions
acted as constraints upon legislative excess in formulating punishments, while the “propor-
tionate punishment” provisions acted as guides for further legislative reform.
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fines and then go on to prohibit “cruel and unusual punishments” if that term
itself forbade excessive sentences, including fines.69 Thus, reading a propor-
tionality principle into the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would
render the Excessive Fines Clause superfluous.70
This argument is similarly flawed in that it conceives of excessiveness as
necessarily using the gravity of the crime as its benchmark. It is true that the
Excessive Fines Clause might be read to forbid this type of disproportionality.
But there is persuasive evidence that that Clause was intended also to forbid a
wholly different kind of disproportionality: excessiveness of fines in relation to
the defendant’s ability to pay. At common law, one who could not pay a fine
was imprisoned until he was able to pay. Thus, absent a ban on the imposition
of fines that are beyond the ability of the defendant to pay, any offense for
which a fine is a prescribed punishment could in reality be punished by indefi-
nite—even perpetual—imprisonment.71 Indeed, the history of England is
replete with such examples.72 The Excessive Fines Clause was meant, at least
in part, to curb such practices.73
Moreover, even a fine that could technically be satisfied by an offender
might be deemed excessive if the offender were thereby ruined financially and
unable to maintain his livelihood. Very recently, two commentators have
demonstrated separately through exhaustive historical research that the Exces-
sive Fines Clause was designed to calibrate fines, not only to the severity of the
offense, but also to the offender’s ability to pay and maintain his livelihood
thereafter.74 Accordingly, reading the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
69 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 978 n.9.
70 Id.
71 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *373 (1765)
(“[C]orporal punishment, or a stated imprisonment . . . is better than an excessive fine, for
that amounts to imprisonment for life.”).
72 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 267 (1989)
(“In the 1680’s . . . some opponents of the King were forced to remain in prison because they
could not pay the huge monetary penalties that had been assessed.”); Claus, Antidiscrimina-
tion Eighth Amendment, supra note 6, at 137–38 (discussing cases of Samuel Johnson and
Sir Samuel Barnardiston in 1683 and 1684, respectively).
73 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 354–55 (1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“One of the main purposes of the ban on excessive fines was to prevent the King from
assessing unpayable fines to keep his enemies in debtor’s prison.”); Browning-Ferris Indus.,
492 U.S. at 267 (“ ‘The English version [of the excessive Fines Clause] . . . was intended to
curb the excesses of English judges . . . [who] had imposed heavy fines on the King’s
enemies . . . .” (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (alteration added))).
This explains why the ban on excessive fines is coupled in the Eighth Amendment with the
ban on excessive bails, see Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 355 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Concern
with imprisonment may explain why the Excessive Fines Clause is coupled with, and fol-
lows right after, the Excessive Bail Clause.”), given that the main function of bail is not to
somehow approximate the gravity of the crime alleged but to assure the defendant’s return to
court for trial. Only by calibrating bail with the defendant’s ability to pay can courts assure
that it is high enough to discourage flight, and subsequent forfeiture of the bond, but not so
high as to result in lengthy pre-trial detention. The Excessive Bail Clause, similarly to the
Excessive Fines Clause, serves this purpose. Notably, Justice Kennedy’s dissent in
Bajakajian was joined by Justice Scalia. Id. at 344.
74 See Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2014); Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 836–37 (2013); see also Calvin R.
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to encompass a disproportionality component does not render the Excessive
Fines Clause superfluous, as the two Clauses contemplate as evils two very
different types of excessiveness.
As a final textual point, Justice Scalia contended that “it would seem quite
peculiar to refer to cruelty and unusualness for the offense in question, in a
provision having application only to a new government that had never before
defined offenses, and that would be defining new and peculiarly national
ones.”75 However, as Tom Stacy aptly observed, “[t]his argument rests on an
implausible view that, in the eyes of the Founders, new offenses enacted by the
federal government would be incommensurable with existing offenses and their
punishments.”76 Indeed, of the offenses contained in the nation’s first crime
act, most, if not all, were comparable to existing common-law crimes, such as
running away with a ship or vessel77 (comparable to common-law larceny),
forgery of United States securities78 (comparable to common-law larceny by
trick), and murder on the high seas79 (comparable to common-law murder).
Moreover, the Anti-Federalists, in demanding inclusion of what became
the Eighth Amendment, did not seem concerned with “peculiarly national”
crimes. To the contrary, as demonstrated by Patrick Henry’s memorable state-
ments in the Virginia ratifying convention—again, in a portion of his speech
omitted by Justice Scalia in Harmelin—some worried far more about Con-
Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40
VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1259–60 (1987) (observing that pursuant to English common law an
amercement, or fine, was considered excessive if it “was still so large as to infringe upon a
person’s means of earning a living or maintaining himself and his family,” even if not dis-
proportionate to the gravity of the offense). Colgan asserts that the Clause was designed to
encompass a requirement of proportionality taking into account not just the seriousness of
the crime and the offender’s ability to pay, but also “a wide variety of [other] factors.”
Colgan, supra (manuscript at 112). However, most of the considerations she mentions ulti-
mately can be folded into by the concept of offense severity, broadly conceived. See, e.g., id.
(manuscript at 156–58) (mentioning “a defendant’s culpability in relation to his co-defen-
dant’s culpability . . . whether a defendant acted willfully, was ignorant of the law, commit-
ted the crime in the heat of passion or was under duress during the commission of the
crime.” (footnotes omitted)); id. (manuscript at 158–59) (mentioning “whether the defen-
dant . . . expressed remorse or humility, mitigated the resulting harm, or promised to abide
by the law in the future.” (footnotes omitted)); id. (manuscript at 159) (mentioning “a defen-
dant’s individual characteristics like his youth or mental and physical incapacity” (footnotes
omitted)). Ultimately, she agrees with McLean that one non-offense-related factor stood out
to bar fines above a certain amount: the ability of the offender to pay and still maintain a
reasonable livelihood. See id. (manuscript at 154) (“[T]he record indicates that a fine’s pro-
portionality depended on weighing the effect of the fine against aggravating and mitigating
circumstances of the crime, and included an upward bound by which fines that serve to
impoverish would be prohibited.”).
75 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 978.
76 Stacy, supra note 50, at 513 n.215; see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1011 (White, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he people of the new Nation had been living under the criminal law regimes
of the States, and there would have been no lack of benchmarks for determining
unusualness.”).
77 Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112, 114 (providing punishment for certain crimes
against the United States).
78 Id. at 115.
79 Id. at 113.
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gress’s potential creation of new crimes that mirrored those under state law but
that would be punished more severely:
Congress from their general powers may fully go into the business of human legisla-
tion. They may legislate in criminal cases from treason to the lowest offence, petty
larceny. They may define crimes and prescribe punishments. In the definition of
crimes, I trust they will be directed by what wise Representatives ought to be gov-
erned by. But when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor depen-
dence put on the virtue of Representatives.80
Likewise, George Mason appeared concerned that the “new crimes” created by
Congress pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause81 would extend to virtu-
ally all matters traditionally governed by state law:
Under their own Construction of the general Clause at the End of the enumerated
powers the Congress may grant Monopolies in Trade and Commerce, constitute new
Crimes, inflict unusual and severe Punishments, and extend their Power as far as
they shall think proper; so that the State Legislatures have no Security for the Pow-
ers now presumed to remain to them; or the People for their Rights.82
Thus, Justice Scalia’s argument underestimated the prescience of many during
the ratification period in predicting that Congress would use its powers to cre-
ate a federal criminal code that in many ways duplicated state criminal law.
D. Nineteenth-Century Interpretations of Federal and State “Cruel and
Unusual Punishments” Clauses
Finally, Justice Scalia looked at the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause according to nineteenth-century courts and commentators.
He pointed to some “early judicial constructions of the Eighth Amendment and
its state counterparts” as “[p]erhaps the most persuasive evidence” that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause reached only inherently cruel methods
of punishment.83 The earliest case he cited, Barker v. People, was an 1823
decision of a New York trial court in a case involving the punishment of disen-
franchisement for the crime of dueling.84 The entirety of the trial court’s hold-
ing on the Eighth Amendment point was as follows:
The supposed repugnancy of the act to the constitution of the United States, as it is
urged, is to the eighth amendment, which declares, that cruel and unusual punish-
ments shall not be inflicted. The disfranchisement of a citizen is not an unusual pun-
ishment; it was the consequence of treason, and of infamous crimes, and it was
altogether discretionary in the legislature to extend that punishment to other
offences.85
80 Patrick Henry, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 1788), supra note 59,
at 248.
81 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers
. . . .”).
82 George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government formed by the Convention
(1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 11, 13 (Herbert J. Storing & Murray
Dry eds., 1981) (emphasis added).
83 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 982–83 (1991) (plurality opinion).
84 Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457, 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823), aff’d, 3 Cow. 686 (N.Y.
1824).
85 Id.
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That the trial court came to this conclusion without undergoing any kind of
proportionality analysis concededly supports Justice Scalia’s claim.86
Unfortunately for Justice Scalia, this holding did not last long. Justice
Scalia failed to acknowledge that, the following year, the New York Court of
Appeals, while affirming the judgment, discussed at great length why the trial
court had erred on this point: the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the
States.87 This holding, of course, correctly predicted the US Supreme Court’s
decision in Barron v. City of Baltimore88 nine years later. To the extent that the
original public meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause can be
discerned from one sentence in a decision of a state trial judge thirty-two years
after the Clause was ratified—itself a weak argument—any such reliance is
heavily undercut by the fact that the decision on this point was soon rendered
dicta by a higher court.
The other cases Justice Scalia cited89 are equally unhelpful to his cause.
Most of them construed state constitutional analogues to the federal Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.90 But if, as I have argued elsewhere,91 the fed-
eral Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause can be understood only as a unique
restriction on federal power for the benefit of the States, then using state court
construction of state constitutional provisions is of no help in ascertaining the
meaning of a limitation on federal power. Just as Justice Scalia cautioned
against “the notion of a blind incorporation” of the English Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause into our own Constitution,92 we should be hesitant to sim-
ply assume that state constitutional provisions forbidding “cruel punishments”
mean the same thing as the federal Eighth Amendment.
In addition, most of the cases Justice Scalia cited were decided long after
the Clause was adopted. All except one were decided in 1855 or later.93 Of
those construing or purporting to construe the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause of the federal Constitution,94 the earliest is from 1869. It is difficult to
86 But see Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 6, at 950 (contending that the
Barker court “engaged in . . . proportionality review . . . [by] compar[ing] the challenged
punishment to prior punishments given for the same or similar crimes . . . .”).
87 Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686, 701–702 (N.Y. 1824).
88 Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
89 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 983–84 (1991) (plurality opinion).
90 See Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E. 1019, 1020–21 (Ind. 1893); State v. White, 25 P. 33, 35
(Kan. 1890); Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 482, 485–86 (1855); People v.
Morris, 45 N.W. 591, 592–94 (Mich. 1890); Cummins v. People, 3 N.W. 305, 305–06
(Mich. 1879), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Coles, 339 N.W.2d 440 (Mich.
1983); State v. Williams, 77 Mo. 310, 312–13 (1883); In re Bayard, 63 How. Pr. 73, 76–78
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1881); State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572, 575 (Ohio 1900); Aldridge v. Com-
monwealth, 4 Va. Cas. 447, 449–51 (1824).
91 See generally Mannheimer, Federal Punishments, supra note 6; Mannheimer, Response,
supra note 6.
92 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 975.
93 See id. at 983–84. The exception is Aldridge, 4 Va. Cas. 447, decided in 1824, which,
again, interpreted a state constitutional provision.
94 See Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297, 301 (1872); Garcia v. Territory, 1 N.M. 415, 417–19
(1869). Whitten, 47 Ga. at 301, is particularly unreliable, given that it purported to apply the
Eighth Amendment to the State of Georgia some thirty-nine years after the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the Bill of Rights had no application to the States. See Barron v. Mayor &
City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). If the Whitten court was implicitly
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understand how a case decided six to eight decades after the adoption of a
constitutional provision can shed any greater light on the original public mean-
ing of that provision than can our own contemporary powers of investigation.95
After all, when one attempts to discern what the framers and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment meant by “due process of law,” one hardly looks to
cases decided during the 1920s for “[p]erhaps the most persuasive evidence.”96
Finally, Justice Scalia looked to four nineteenth-century legal commenta-
tors to support the proposition that the Clause encompassed no proportionality
requirement.97 Putting to one side the hazards just mentioned of looking to
nineteenth-century sources to discern the meaning of an eighteenth-century
text, not one of these commentators unambiguously supports Justice Scalia’s
position. James Bayard simply did not address the issue.98 Benjamin Oliver, as
Justice Scalia acknowledged, contended that the Eighth Amendment does
require proportionality in carceral sentences: “[I]t would seem, that imprison-
ment for an unreasonable length of time, is also contrary to the spirit of the
constitution.”99 Justice Scalia dismissed Oliver’s reasoning as “somewhat con-
voluted.”100 Justice Scalia also acknowledged that James Kent asserted that
“[t]he punishment of death . . . ought to be confined to the few cases of the
most atrocious character,” in a paragraph whose topic sentence contains the
applying the Eighth Amendment as incorporated by the recently enacted Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it was silent on the matter.
95 The same can be said for the cases cited in Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra
note 6, at 939–41, for the notion that “cruel and unusual” and “cruel or unusual” referred to
excessiveness in 1791. Stinneford cites cases from two separate common-law contexts: the
law of homicide, which sometimes referred to beatings in an excessive manner, resulting in
death, as “cruel and unusual”; and the law of “private punishment”—parent/child, master/
servant, and teacher/student—which also sometimes referred to excessive beatings as “cruel
and unusual” punishment. Id. Yet, the earliest case Stinneford cites from the private punish-
ment context was decided in 1827, and he cites cases decided as late as 1892. Id. at 941
nn.193, 195. And other than a single 1796 North Carolina case, the earliest case he cites
from the homicide context was decided in 1838. Id. at 939–40 nn.190–91. Thus, regarding
virtually all the cases he cites, which post-date ratification of the Eighth Amendment by at
least a generation, there is something of a chicken-and-egg puzzle: did the state and federal
cruel and unusual punishments clauses draw their meaning from the use elsewhere in the
common law of the phrase “cruel and unusual” as a synonym for “excessive,” as Stinneford
claims? Or did later common-law judges borrow from state and federal constitutions the
handy catchphrase “cruel and unusual” and use it as a synonym for “excessive” regardless of
whether that is what those constitutions meant by that phrase?
96 Cf. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 1, 6, 9 (1927) (interpreting Due
Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment as granting individuals the right to freely bargain
over the price of cream).
97 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 981–82 (plurality opinion) (citing JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPO-
SITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (2d ed. 1840); BENJAMIN L. OLI-
VER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 185 (1832); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 10–11 (1827); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1896 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1970) (1833)).
98 BAYARD, supra note 97, at 153–54; accord Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra
note 6, at 961 (“James Bayard . . . did not consider whether the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause was meant to prohibit excessive punishments.”).
99 OLIVER, supra note 97, at 185.
100 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 981.
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words “cruel and unusual punishments are universally condemned.”101 It is
possible, as Justice Scalia suggested, that Kent’s views on limiting capital pun-
ishment were a simple policy preference rather than a position on constitutional
requirements.102 However, given that the contents of a paragraph typically
relate in some way to the paragraph’s topic sentence, the passage is at least
ambiguous in this regard.
With regard to Justice Story, Justice Scalia once again committed a sin of
omission by failing to acknowledge a relevant excerpt that undercut his claim.
Justice Scalia cited Justice Story’s Commentaries for the proposition that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was “adopted as an admonition to all
departments of the national government, to warn them against such violent pro-
ceedings as had taken place in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the
Stuarts.”103 After this passage, however, Justice Story continued: “Upon this
subject, Mr. Justice Blackstone has wisely remarked that sanguinary laws are a
bad symptom of the distemper of any state . . . .”104 Blackstone had little prob-
lem with capital punishment in itself, but complained that it was an excessive
punishment for some crimes.105 That Justice Story began this observation with
the words “[u]pon this subject,” having just discussed the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, demonstrates that, in his view, the Clause does address
disproportionality.
Justice Scalia also curiously ignored Thomas Cooley, who suggested in
1868 that state constitutional provisions forbidding cruel and unusual punish-
ments do, in fact, prohibit punishments excessive in a particular way: in rela-
tion to that permitted under common law. Cooley wrote that “probably any new
statutory offence may be punished to the extent and in the mode permitted by
the common law for offences of similar nature.”106 While Cooley was discuss-
ing state constitutional provisions rather than the federal Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, elsewhere in his Harmelin opinion,107 as previously
noted, Justice Scalia indicated his position that nineteenth-century views on the
former informed the meaning of the latter.
In sum, the nineteenth-century sources upon which Justice Scalia relied do
not unambiguously support the proposition that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause was originally understood as regulating only the methods of pun-
ishment and not their excessiveness. Some are equivocal on the point, some
seem to refute it, and others are simply too far distant from the adoption of the
Eighth Amendment to shed much light on the question at all.
101 2 KENT, supra note 97, at 10.
102 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 982.
103 3 STORY, supra note 97, § 1896.
104 Id. (emphasis added).
105 See John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death
Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 206 (2009) (“Black-
stone favored the death penalty in only limited circumstances.”).
106 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 472 (7th ed. 1903)
(emphasis added); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 375 (1910) (quoting this
passage).
107 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 982–83.
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III. USE OF THE TERM “CRUEL OR UNUSUAL” IN STATE LEGISLATION
RATIFYING THE 1783 CONFEDERAL IMPOST RESOLUTION
The sources Justice Scalia cited in Harmelin fail to show that “cruel and
unusual punishment” in 1791 referred only to methods of punishment and not
excessiveness of punishment. If anything, they point in the other direction.
There is one source, however, overlooked by Justice Scalia—indeed, over-
looked by virtually everyone until now108—that suggests that the similar term
“cruel or unusual” was understood in 1791 as referring to punishment that was
excessive in some way.
On April 18, 1783, the Articles of Confederation Congress “recommended
to the several states” that Congress be vested with the power to levy duties on
certain imported goods, such as rum, tea, sugar, coffee, wine, and molasses.109
By its terms, and because the creation of a new power in Congress was, in
effect, an amendment to the Articles, the resolution could not take effect unless
and until it was ratified by every State.110 Ultimately, the 1783 Impost Resolu-
tion did not take effect because New York refused to ratify it in a manner
acceptable to Congress.111
But the other States did pass legislation ratifying the 1783 Impost Resolu-
tion. And a majority—eight of thirteen—included in their ratifying legislation
what can be characterized as a “mini-bill of rights.”112 These mini-bills con-
tained provisions that would protect their citizenry from the confederal govern-
ment in investigating, prosecuting, and punishing for violations of the proposed
impost. They contained many of the provisions, such as a bar on general war-
rants, that appeared in state bills of rights and would in short order become part
of the federal Bill of Rights.
Importantly, six of these eight States—Georgia, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina—included in their
ratifying legislation a precursor to the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
108 I have uncovered no law review article that even mentions the “cruel or unusual” punish-
ments clauses of the state legislation discussed below. I have discussed this topic previously
in a less formal setting. Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, The “Mini-Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clauses” of the 1783 State Customs Legislation, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/02/the-mini-cruel-and-unusual-punish
ments-clauses-of-the-1783-state-customs-legislation.html.
109 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 256, 256–57 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1922).
110 Id. at 259; see also Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change,
122 YALE L.J. 1104, 1113 (2013) (discussing similar 1781 resolution); JACKSON TURNER
MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781–1788, at 73 (1961)
(same).
111 See Campbell, supra note 110, at 1120, 1124–26.
112 See THE RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS OF THE 18TH OF APRIL, 1783: RECOMMENDING THE
STATES TO INVEST CONGRESS WITH THE POWER TO LEVY AN IMPOST, FOR THE USE OF THE
STATES; AND THE LAWS OF THE RESPECTIVE STATES, PASSED IN PURSUANCE OF THE SAID
RECOMMENDATION 6 (New Hampshire), 9–10 (Massachusetts), 11–13 (Rhode Island), 27,
30–31 (Pennsylvania), 38, 40 (Virginia), 40, 42 (North Carolina), 43–45 (South Carolina),
46, 48 (Georgia) (1787). Additionally, Delaware required that all confederal “rules and ordi-
nances be not repugnant to the constitution and laws of [Delaware],” id. at 32, and Maryland
similarly required that all confederal “ordinances, regulations and arrangements shall not be
repugnant to the [Maryland] constitution . . . .” Id. at 37.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ212.txt unknown Seq: 18  8-APR-14 12:42
Spring 2014] HARMELIN’S FAULTY ORIGINALISM 539
Punishments Clause. Rhode Island provided that Congress must not “inflict
punishments which are cruel or unusual” for violations of any impost.113 Simi-
larly, Pennsylvania required that Congress not “impos[e] any unusual punish-
ments or penalty.”114 Georgia,115 Massachusetts,116 New Hampshire,117 and
South Carolina118 each forbade Congress from “inflict[ing] punishments which
are either cruel or unusual in this State” (or in Massachusetts, “in this
commonwealth”).
Given this, Justice Scalia’s and Justice Thomas’s view that “cruel and
unusual” and “cruel or unusual” referred only to methods of punishment119 is
highly implausible. If that view were correct, the “cruel or unusual” language
was included in the state legislation discussed above because of a concern that
the confederal government would punish those who evaded the impost with
torturous corporal or capital punishments. Yet history is bereft of any examples
of smugglers being treated in such fashion. To the contrary, the primary penalty
for smugglers was economic: fines and forfeiture of the uncustomed goods and
the vessel in which they were transported.
Legislation enacted by the First Congress is indicative of how evaders of
customs and imposts were punished at the time. For failure to report promptly
to the collector of duties for the district, the master of a vessel was subject to a
fine of $500.120 For unloading a ship at nighttime or without a permit from the
collector, the master of the vessel and any accomplices were to be fined $400
and disqualified for seven years “from holding any office of trust or profit
under the United States.” In addition, the ship and its goods were to be for-
feited.121 The punishment for concealing goods potentially subject to forfeiture
was a sum equal to twice the value of the goods.122 Offering a bribe to a collec-
tion officer would result in a fine of between $200 and $2,000.123 Swearing
falsely regarding dutiable goods was punished most harshly: a fine of up to
$1,000 and imprisonment of up to one year.124
To be sure, smuggling was treated more harshly under English law.
According to Blackstone, “clandestine smuggling” was generally punished
through economic sanctions of fine and forfeiture.125 For “more open, daring,
and avowed” smuggling, however, the punishment was transportation to the
113 See id. at 13.
114 Id. at 31.
115 See id. at 48.
116 See id. at 10.
117 See id. at 7.
118 See id. at 44.
119 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 99 (2010) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]he Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was originally understood as prohibit-
ing [only] torturous ‘methods of punishment’ . . . specifically methods akin to those that had
been considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
120 Regulation of the Collection of Duties on Tonnage and on Merchandise, ch. 5, sec. 11, 1
Stat. 29, 39 (1789).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 43.
123 Id. at 46.
124 Id. at 47.
125 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *155.
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new world for seven years.126 And smuggling could be punished by death, if
performed forcibly: if three or more persons assembled together with weapons
to assist in the smuggling, or in retrieving seized goods or smugglers; or if one
wounded or shot at a revenue officer in the course of smuggling.127 Yet neither
transportation—that is, temporary banishment—nor death would have been
considered an “unusual” method of punishment in 1783.128 And there is no
indication that anyone feared that Congress would punish smugglers with the
only types of punishment Justices Scalia and Thomas believe would have been
characterized as “cruel and unusual” in 1783: those capital punishments “pur-
posely designed to inflict pain and suffering beyond that necessary to cause
death.”129
It is thus inconceivable that six States forbade the confederal government
from inflicting “cruel or unusual” punishments on evaders of the proposed
1783 impost because they feared that smugglers would be drawn and quartered,
burned at the stake, or whipped to death. To the contrary, it is far more likely
that the concern was that smugglers would be punished excessively. This is
especially so in light of England’s prescription of capital punishment for “forci-
ble” smuggling. Death was a widely accepted punishment for some crimes, but
the impost legislation in Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina strongly suggests that these States
did not consider death acceptable punishment for mere smuggling. Accord-
ingly, not only do Justice Scalia’s arguments in Harmelin fall of their own
weight, there is strong evidence that the term “cruel or unusual” was under-
stood at the time of the framing as going to the excessiveness of punishments.
CONCLUSION
In his influential plurality opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, Justice Scalia
offered evidence that is, at best, ambiguous as to whether the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishments Clause was understood in 1791 to encompass a principle that
demanded proportionality. More importantly, the weight of the evidence sup-
ports the notion that the Clause did encompass some requirement of proportion-
ality, though not necessarily between crime gravity and punishment severity.
Thus, several questions remain. What type of proportionality does the Clause
require? And to what extent, if at all, is the Clause’s proportionality require-
ment incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment? Scholars
are busy trying to formulate answers to these questions.130 But to say that “[i]t
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 23 (2002) (noting
that the death penalty was administered in every State at the founding); LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 40 (1993) (observing that ban-
ishment was a common punishment in the eighteenth century).
129 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 96 (2008) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
130 See Claus, Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, supra note 6, at 122–24 (asserting
that the Eighth Amendment requires proportionality among similarly situated offenders and
classes of offenders); see Mannheimer, Federal Punishments, supra note 6, at 123–26
(asserting that Eighth Amendment requires proportionality between federal and state sen-
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is . . . well established that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was
originally understood as prohibiting [only] torturous ‘methods of punish-
ment’ ”131 is flatly and demonstrably wrong.
tencing); Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality, supra note 6, at 899 (asserting that Eighth
Amendment requires proportionality based on punishments that have historically been
administered for the same or similar offense).
131 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 99 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
